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When an agent, acting within the scope of his authority
on behalf of a principal, enters into a contract with a third
party, the agent is usually not liable to the third party for
the
contract's performance . 1
However,
under certain
circumstances, an agent may be liable as a party to the
contract. The purpose of this article is to discuss the rules
of agency law which determine the liability of an agent who
acts within the scope of his authority. 2 In the first part of
this article, · I present the general rules in the abstract.
Next, I discuss the theoretical justifications for an<;i the
theoretical difficulties with these rules.
Specifically, I
attempt to point out the theoretical difficulties which arise
when these rules are applied to cases where an agent
negotiates a contract on behalf of a business which,
unbeknownst to the third party, is owned by someone other than
the agent, or if owned by the agent, is incorporated.
I
suggest that, in such cases, agent liability may result even
where it is not a fair conclusion that the third party or the
agent manifested an intent for the agent to be liable or that
the third party relied on the liability of the agent.
Finally, I discuss an approach found in a few cases which
denies agent liability whe.r e it is not a fair conclusion that
the third party dealt with the agent as an individual, rather
than as an agent, or relied on his individual liability.
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on behalf of a principal essentially depends upon the
agreement between the agent and the third party. 1 However, in
determining whether the agent and the third party intended for
the agent to be liable, courts apply certain rules of agency
law which are as follows.
While the third party has the
initial burden of showing that the agent made a contractual
promise, 4 the agent, to avoid liability, must establish that,
at the time that the contract was made, the third party had
notice that the agent was acting in a representative capacity
as well as notice of the principal's identity.s Where the
third party has notice of the fact of agency and of the
identity of the principal, the principal is said to be
"disclosed". 6 In such a case, the agent is not personally
liable unless, of course, the third party can establish that
there was nonetheless an agreement for the agent to be
liable. 7 Where the third party is without notice of the fact
of agency, the principal is said to be uundisclosed". 8 In
this situation, the agent is liable as a party to the
contract. 9 Where the third party has notice that the agent is
or may be acting in a representative capacity, but is without
notice of the identity of the principal, the principal is said
to be "partially disclosed., • 10
The agent of a partially
disclosed principal is presumptively liable as a party to the
contract.
That is, the agent is liable unless he can
establish that there was a mutual intention that he not be
liable. 11
To illustrate these rules, consider the hypothetical case
of Arnold Agent, an interior decorator who is hired by his
client, Polly Principal, to purchase an oriental rug on her
behalf. First, suppose that Arnold orders the rug and that,
at the time of the order, he tells the seller that he is
acting as an agent on behalf of Polly Principal. Because the
seller has notice of the fact of agency as well as notice of
the identity of the principal, the principal is disclosed and
Arnold is presumptively not liable for the contract. Suppose
now that Arnold orders the rug in his own name without
indicating that he is purchasing the rug as an agent of
another. Because in this case, the seller is without notice
that Arnold is acting in a representative capacity, the
principal is undisclosed and Arnold is liable as a party to
the contract.
Finally, suppose that Arnold tells the seller
that he is purchasing the rug for "a client" without informing
her of the name of the client. Because here, the principal is
only partially disclosed, Arnold is presumptively liable as a
party to the contract. 12
Theoretical Considerations
Underlying the liability of the agent of an undisclosed
principal is the assumption that, without notice of the
existence of the principal, the third party obviously intends
to deal with the agent as an individual, not as an agent. 13
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In other words, the third party intends for the agent to be
liable as the ostensible principal. t 4
Underlying the
presumptive liability of the agent of a partially disclosed
principal is the assumption that, without notice of the
identity of the principal, the third party is probably
unwilling to rely solely on the credit of the unknown
and therefore inte'?ds for the agent to be personally
as well. IS Moreover, lt has been explained that it mav
also be presumed that the agent agrees to be
Finally, the liability of the agent of an undisclosed or
partially disclosed principal has been justified on the basis
that an agent can easily avoid liability simply by disclosing,
at the time of the contract, the existence and identity of the
principal. 17
In the above hypothetical examples involving an
undisclosed and a partially disclosed principal, the liability
of the agent makes sense in terms of the probable intent of
the parties. That is, in the example where Arnold's principal
is undisclosed, the seller has no reason to believe that
Arnold is acting on behalf of anyone but himself and thus
obviously intends for Arnold to be liable as the ostensible
principal. In the example where Arnold simply indicates that
he is purchasing the rug for "a client", it is also a fair
inference that, without notice of the name of the client, the
seller is relying on Arnold as a party to the contract. In
addition, in either example, it is probably a fair conclusion
that Arnold agrees to be liable.
While in the above hypothetical examples, the rules
determining the liability of an authorized agent are rather
straightforward, they present a number of theoretical
difficulties in certain cases.
To illustrate, consider the
cases of Saco Dairy Co. v. Norton13 and Judith Garden; Inc. v.
Mapel. 19
In Saco Dairy, the manager of the "Breakwater
Court 11 , a hotel owned by his mother, was held liable for dairy
goods that he had ordered for the hotel even though all bills
were in the name of the hotel and the plaintiff never charged
the manager personally until the hotel failed to make payment.
On appeal, the manager argued that his use of the hotel's name
in ordering the goods was notice of the fact of agency and of
the identity of the principal to relieve him of personal
liability for the contract.
In rejecting the manager's
argument, the higher court explained that " ( t) he fact that the
defendant was operating the business of a hotel under the name
of 'Breakwater Court' was at least as consistent with the fact
that he was the proprietor as that he was the manager for
anotheru. 20 Therefore, the court refused to disturb the lower
court's finding that the manager acted as the agent of an
undisclosed principal. 21
In Judith Garden, the court held the operator of "The
Gazebo 11 , an incorporated retail store, liable for an oral
contract that she had negotiated to purchase certain
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merchandise for the store. Even though the plaintiff itself
was an incorporated retail store similar to "The Gazebo", 22
the court concluded that the defendant acted as the agent of
an undisclosed principal because, at the time of the contract,
she did not make the plaintiff aware that "The Gazebo" was a
trade name used by a corporation rather than a trade name
under which she did business as an individual proprietor. 23
The court explained that it is the burden of the party seeking
to avoid personal lia.bility to disclose the fact of agency and
the name of the principal and that " [ i] t is not ·a tenable
defense to urge that the other party had the means to discover
this. u2.4
The significance of the corporate status of the
business is, of course,
that a corporation is generally
recognized as an entity which is legally distinct from its
owners, the
Thus, unlike a sole proprietor
who is personally liable for contractual obligations incurred
in operating her business, 26 or a general partner who is
personally liable for the contractual obligations of the
partnership, rr a shareholder, as a general rule, is not
personally liable for the contractual obligations of the
corporation. 28
However, as illustrated by Judith Garden, a
shareholder who negotiates a contract on behalf of a
corporation acts as an agent of the corporation and thus, may
become a party to the contract under agency
Saco Dairy and Judith Garden are typical of cases where
the third party was
aware that the agent was acting on
account of some business, but the agent could not show that,
at the time that the contract was made, the ·third party had
reason to know that the business was owned by someone other
than
the
alfent, 30 or
if
owned
by
the
agent,
was
incorporated.
In such cases, most courts have held, as in
Saco Dairy and Judith Garden, that an agent's use of the
principal's trade name in negotiating a contract is not, at
least as a matter of law, sufficient notice of the fact of
agency and of the identity of the principal to relieve the
agent of liability. n
Thus, in cases like Saco Dairy and
Judith Garden , where the principal's trade name and other
circumstances surrounding the contract are consistent with the
possibility that the agent is the real principal in interest,
the agent must make known, at the time of the contract, who
the actual proprietor of the business is, and in the case of
an incorporated business, that the business is incorporated.
Otherwise, the principal may be deemed undisclosed and the
agent liable as the ostensible principa1. 33
Alternatively,
the agent may be liable as the agent of a partially disclosed
principal on the theory that although the third party has
notice that the agent is or may be acting in a representative
capacity, the "true" principal is not disclosed or, at least,
not sufficiently disclosed. 34 It is important to note that,
under the specific circumstances of a case, the use of the
principal's trade name may be sufficient notice of the
existence and identity of the principal. 35 However, where the
third party has no reason to know that the business on whose
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account the agent is acting is something other than a sole
proprietorship owned by the agent or perhaps a partnership in
which the agent is a partner, the agent
be liable as a
matter of law. 36
Where the third party knows that the agent is acting on
account of a business and the business is identified by some
to say that the principal is undisclosed or partially
dJ.sclosed presents several theoretical difficulties.
The
first theoretical difficulty concerns the assumption implicit
in cases like Saco Dairy and Judith Garden that at the time
the contract, the third party intended for
agent to be
In this regard, it is obviously not always a fair
1nference that, in entering into a contract like the one in
Saco Dairy or that in Judith Garden, the third party assumes
that the agent is personally doing business as an individual
p:oprietor or partner. and thus intends for the agent to be
lJ.able. For example,
the absence of some representation by
the defendant or other circumstances suggesting that the
defendant actually owned the "Breakwater Court", is it really
a fair inference that the plaintiff in Saco Dairy assumed that
it was dealing with the defendant as an individual?37
Similarly, in Judith Garden, given that the plaintiff itself
an incorporated
business, is it really a fair
that the
president, who negotiated the
contract, assumed that "The Gazebo" was not incorporated?
Isn't it more likely that she simply did not know one way or
the other how "The Gazebo" was organized?
Moreover in a
case like Judith Garden, where a third party enters into a
contract with a business without any reason to know and
without inquiring into the status of the business or that of
the agent, doesn't she really agree to a contract with the
business, whoever the owner of the business is and whether the
business is incorporated or not, and not with the agent as an
individual?
The second theoretical difficulty concerns the intent of
the agent. Under traditional contract principles, the basis
for contract liability is one's objective manifestations of
However, can it be said that, in a case like saco
Dairy or Judith Garden, the agent manifests his assent to be
That is.'
contracts negotiated by agents
only the
trade name are commonplace, if not
usual. Therefore, it can hardly be said that in ordering the
dairy goods in the name of the "Breakwater court" or in
purchasing merchandise in the name of "The Gazebo", the
def7ndants in . Saco Dairy and .Judith Garden., respectively,
man1fested the1r assent to be l1able. Yet in each case the
plaintiff was able to recover against the 'defendant.
'
The third theore t i cal difficulty involves the concern
that, under the approach taken in Sa co Dairy and Judith
Garden, a third party may recover against the agent even where
it is unlikely that she relied on the individual liability of
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the agent.
In saco Dairy, for example, it is hardly likely
that the ownership of the "Breakwater Court" was in any way
material to the plaintiff's agreement to supply dairy goods to
the hotel. The plaintiff made all bills out to the hotel and
never charged the defendant personally until the hotel failed
to make payment. In Judith Garden, where the plaintiff itself
was an incorporated retail business similar to "The Gazebo"
and whose president thus had good reason to suspect that "The
Gazebo" might also. be incorporated, it is unlikely that, in
agreeing to sell the merchandise .to "The Ga.zebo", the
plaintiff relied on .the individual liability of the defendant.
Yet, in each case, the plaintiff was a.b le to recover against
the defendant. 39
An Alternative Approach
Although most courts have followed the approach
illustrated by SacoDairy and Judith Garden, a few courts have
denied agent liability even
:the
surrounding the contract were
the
that the agent was the real principal in interest. Consider,
40
tor example, the cases of Hess v. Kennedy ,
Rabinowi.tz . v.
Zell 41 and SWeitzer v. Whitehead. 42
In Hess, the
purchased a dress from a department store owned by the sons of
the defendant under the family naxue "Kennedy". The sale was
made by a sales clerk, but in the presence of the defendant
who apparently helped negotiate the contract. Subsequent to
the sale, the plaintiff tried to return the dress at which
time the defendant approved an exchange and directed an
employee to take the dress back.
the plaintiff
unable to find another dress to her
she brought su1t
against the defendant for the return of the purchase price.
The trial court concluded that the defendant held herself out
as the principal and was therefore liable to the
In reversing the trial court, the appellate court
out
that there was nothing in the record which showed that the
defendant "did anything which was calculated to cause the
'plaintiff to believe that she owned the store, other than to
exercise the authority which is usually intrusted to the head
of the sales department." 44
The court also stated that
[u)ndoubtedly, when the plaintiff entered this
store for the purchase of the dress, she understood
that she was dealing with the proprietor of the
store, whoever that might be . . . • (and that) it
certainly cannot be contended that the purchaser
.••
can
hold
the
salesman,
or
even
the
superintendent of the store ... as a party to the
contract of sale, upon the theory that it is the
duty of one left in charge of a store to disclose
that he is an agent, and not the proprietor of the
store. 45
In Rabinowitz, the same court that decided Hess refused

to hold an agent liable for a written ·contract that he had
signed using only the trade name of his employer.
In this
case, the plaintiff had addressed a written offer to sell
certain goods to "Eastern Leather Goods". The defendant zell
an employee of an individual doing business under the
name 11 The Eastern Leather Specialty Company", then accepted
the offer by signing the plaintiff' s offer "The Eastern
Leather Specialty ·company, D. H. Zell".
In reversing the
trial court's judgment holding the defendant personally
liable, the appellate court explained that "it (was) evident
that his signature was intended to show who the person was who
signed for the person or persons operating under the trade
name." 46 The court further explained that
[t]he plaintiff was dealing with the ' business house
using the trade name referred to • . . . [and that)
[ i) t is of no importance in this action against
[the defendant) for goods sold that the plaintiff
did not know who was trading under the trade name.
His agreement was with the person or persons so
trading.
If I agree with "Billy, the oyster Man",
and do not know his name,
my contract is
nonetheless with the person, whoever he is,
conducting business under that name. 47
Finally, c.onsider the case of Sweitzer v. Whitehead in
which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to bold two
officers of a corporation liable for a contract that they had
negotiated even though, at the time of the contract, the
plaintiffs were not made aware of the corporate status of the
defendants' business and during negotiations, one defendant
referred to the other as his upartner" .
In this case, the
defendants, Land and Whitehead, entered into a contract on
behalf of "Land-Whitehead Equipment company" to sell on a
commission basis certain equipment owned by the plaintiffs.
After the equipment went unsold and the plaintiffs discovered
that some of the equipment was missing and the rest damaged,
the
plaintiffs
brought. suit
against
the
defendants
individually as well as their corporate principal.
The jury
returned a verdict for the plaintiffs and the defendants moved
for judgment n.o.v.
In denying the defendants' motion, the
lower court explained that "whether they acted as principals
or agents for a disclosed principal was
primarily a
question for a jury and that there was sufficient evidence to
sustain the jury's finding that •.• [the defendants) acted as
and were understood by (the plaintiffs) to be acting as
principals rather than agents. " 48 On appeal, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that j udg:ment n. o. v. should have been
entered in favor of the defendants because the plaintiffs had
notice that the defendants were acting in a representative
capacity as well as notice of the principal's
While purporting to apply agency law, the court supported
its decision largely on the basis that the plaintiffs did not
deal with the defendants as individuals or rely on their
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individual liability.
In this regard, the court noted that
the plaintiffs had entrusted the defendants with their
equipment without investigating the status of the defendants
or that of "Land-Whitehead Equipment company", and that apart
from the reference to Land as Whitehead's partner and the
absence of an indication that their business was a
corporation, there was no evidence which could justify the
assumption that the plaintiffs dealt with the defendants as
individuals rather than as agents of "Land-Whitehead Equipment
Company" • 50
Thus , the court concluded that 11 [ t) o premise
individual liability on the quantum of proof adduced by [the
plaintiffs] would substitute conjecture and surmise for
proof. " 51
In each of these three cases,
even though the
circumstances surrounding the contract were consistent with
the possibility that the agent was the real principal in
interest, the agent was able to avoid personal liability. In
terms of agency principles, perhaps the approach in these
cases may be stated as follows. Where the third party knows
that the agent is acting on account of a business and the
business is identified by some name, although a trade name,
the principal is disclosed and the agent,
at least
presumptively, not liable.
This approach is a sensible one
because it recognizes that in many informally arranged
contracts, where a third party enters into the contract
without sufficient reason to know and without inquiring into
the status of the agent or that of the business on whose
account the agent is acting, she essentially agrees to a
contract with the business, whoever its owner is and whether
or not it is incorporated, and not with the agent as an
individual.
conversely, it is usually not a fair inference
that an agent, who uses the trade name of a business without
indicating the name of the proprietor of or the corporate
status of the business, agrees to be personally liable.
Thus, under such circumstances, the third party should not be
able to recover against the agent as an individual.
Presumably, even under this alternative approach, where
the third party can show that she dealt with the agent as an
indi vidua 1 or re 1 ied on his individual 1 iabi 1 i ty, she may
recover against the agent.
However, in the absence of any
prior dealings between the third party and the agent as an
individual
or
of
any
representations
by
the
agent
unequivocally indicating that he is the real principal in
interest, it is difficult to see how the third party can
satisfy this burden.
For example, in Sweitzer, the court
concluded that evidence that the plaintiffs were not made
aware of the corporate status of the defendants' business and
that one defendant referred to the other as his "partner" was
simply not sufficient to even raise a question for the jury as
to "whether reliance was flaced on the individuals as such
rather than the entity. ,s
Even assuming that the third
party can show that she dealt with the agent as an individual,

must her failure to inquire into the status of the agent and
that of the business have been reasonable? That is, are there
circumstances under which a third party has a duty to inquire?
Thus, while the alternative approach avoids the theoretical
difficulties arising under the approach taken in saco Dairy
and Judith Garden, the approach is not without its own
practical and
difficulties.
SUllllllary
While., in the abstract, the rules imposing liability on
the agent of an undisclosed or partially disclosed principal
are fairly straightforward, they present a number of
theoretical difficulties in cases where an agent negotiates a
contract in the name of a business, which unbeknownst to the
third party, is owned by someone else or is incorporated.
Under the approach followed by most courts, the agent, in such
cases, may be held liable as the agent of an undisclosed or
partially disclosed principal.
However, this approach is
theoretically problematic because agent liability may result
even though it is not a fair conclusion that the third party
or the agent manifested an intent for the agent to be liable
or that the third party relied on the individual liability of
the agent. Under an alternative approach, the third party is
unable to recover against the agent where it is not a fair
conclusion that the third party dealt with the . agent as an
individual or relied on his individual liability.
Although
this alternative approach avoids the theoretical difficulties
arising under the majority approach, it is not without its own
practical and theoretical difficulties.
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See, e.g., 1 FLOYD R. MECHEM 1 LAW OF AGENCY § 1406, at 1037
(2d ed. 1914)" ( 11 If the agent makes a full disclosure of the
fact of his agency and of the name of his principal, and
contracts only as the agent of the named principal, he incurs
no personal responsibility.").
1.

2. This article deals only with the liability of an agent who
acts within the scope of his authority.
When an agent acts
without actual authority, he may be liable to the third party
on a breach of warranty theory. Specifically, when an agent
purports to act on behalf of a principal 1 he is held to
impliedly warrant that he has actual authority to enter into
the contract in question.
If he does not have actual
authority and as a result, the principal is not bound to the
third party, the agent is liable to the third party for breach
of an implied warranty of authority. E.g., REsTATEMENT {SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 329 (1957).
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v. Knapp, 71 N.Y. 348, 352 (1877)("It is not sufficient that
the seller (third party] may have the means of ascertaining
the name of the principal
He must have actual
knowledge."); VanderWagen Bros. v. Barnes, 304 N.E. 2d 663,
665 (Ill. App. ct. 1973) ("It is not sufficient that the third
party has knowledge of facts and circumstances which would, if
followed by reasonable inquiry, disclose the identity of the
principal. u).
For a discussion of the subjective and
objective standards for notice, as applied in Louisiana cases,
see John C. Geyer, Note, Let
Agent Beware: Wilkinson v.
sweeny and Undisclosed corporate status, so LA. L. REv. 1183,
1190-1193 (1990)
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11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 321 (1957). That the agent
may be liable under the foregoing rules does not preclude the
liability of the principal as well. If the agent has actual
authority to act on behalf of the principal, the principal,
whether disclosed, partially disclosed or undisclosed, is
generally liable. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 144, 147,
186 (1957). Under the traditional rule, the liability of the
agent and the principal is in the alternative and the third
party must elect whether to pursue the agent or the principal.
see, e.g., vanderWagen Bros. v. Barnes, 304 N.E. 2d 663,665
(Ill. App. ct. 1973). Many modern courts have rejected the

application of the doctrine of election of remedies in this
context and have held the liability of the agent and the
principal to be joint and several. See, e.g., crown Controls
Inc. v. Smiley, 756 P.2d 717 (Wash. 1988). For a theoretical
discussion of, among other things, the liability of the
principal in the undisclosed principal situation, see Randy E.
Barnett, Squaring Undisclosed Agency Law wit:h contract Theory,
75 CALIF. L. REv. 1969 (1987).
12. It has been pointed out that it is sometimes to the
principal's advantage for the agent to intentionally conceal
the existence and/or identity of the principal because the
third party might charge the principal more or pay him less
than she would the agent, or might not deal with the principal
at all. However, with certain exceptions, the third party is
generally liable to the partially disclosed and even
undisclosed principal on the terms negotiated by the agent.
Thus, a principal may instruct.his agent not to disclose the
existence or identity of the principal. See Martin Schiff,
The Problem of the Undisclosed Principal and How it Affects
and Third Party, 1984 DET. C.L. REv. 47, 47-49.

13. James G. Smith & Assoc. v. Everett, 439 N.E.2d 932 1 935
(Ohio ct. App. 1981).
14. See, e.g., MEcHEM, supra note 1, § 1410, at 1039-40 ( 11An
agent who conceals the fact of agency and contracts as the
ostensible principal is liable in the same manner and to the
extent as though he were the real principal in
l.nterest. tt) i WARREN A. SEAVEY, LAW OF AGENCY 211 ( 1964)
("Obviously, if the existence of the principal is unknown, the
agent makes a personal promise.").
15. James G. Smith & Assoc. v. Everett, 439 N.E.2d 932, 935
(Ohio Ct. App. 1981). See also Benton v. campbell Parker &
Co., [1925] 2 K.B. 410, 414 {"It is presumed that the other
party is. unwilling to contract solely with an unknown roan. He
is willing to contract with an unknown man, and does so, but
only if the agent will make himself personally liable •.•. ").
16. See, e.g.• , Cobb v. Knapp, 71 N.Y. 348, 352-53 (1877)
(stating that when agents fail to indicate the name of their
principal, "it must be presumed that they intend to be
liable").
17. See, e.g., Id. at 352 ("There is no hardship in the rule
of liability against agents. They always have it in their
power to relieve themselves .••• ).
18. 35 A.2d 857 (Me. 1944).
19. 342 N.¥.S.2d 486 (Civ. Ct.), aff'd, 348 N.Y.S.2d 975 (App.
Term 1973).
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32. E.g., Lachmann v. Houston Chronicle Publishing co., 375
S.W.2d 783, 785 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) (citing Annotation, Use
of tradename in connection with contract executed by agent as
sufficient disclosure of agency or principal to protect agent
against personal liability, 150 A.L.R. 1303 {1944)).

20. 35 A.2d at 858.
21. Id. at 859.
22. 342 N.Y.S.2d at 487.

24. Id.

25. E.g. 1 1 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER
PR:IVli.TE CORPORATIONS S 25 (perm. ed. rev.
2 6 • E.g. , HARRY G. HENN

See, e.g., Como v. Rhines, 645 P.2d 948 (Mont. 1982)
(holding president of "Sound West, Inc." liable for breach of
an employment contract where he could not show that, at time
of hiring, plaintiff understood he was hired by "Sound west,
Inc.", a corporation, rather than by an individual doing
business as "SoUnd West");
African Bio-Botanica, Inc. v.
Leiner, 624 A.2d 1003 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993)
(holding
sole
shareholder/president
of
''Ecco
Bella
Incorporated" liable for merchandise ordered on behalf of
"Ecco Bella" where she could not show that plaintiff had
notice that her business was a corporation); Howell v. Smith,
134 S.E.2d 381 (N.C. 1964) (holding owner of "Atlantic Block
Company" liable for purchase of petroleum products where he
failed to make known that "Atlantic Block Company" was
actually "Atlantic Block Co., Inc.", a corporation); Givner v.
United States Hoffman Machinery Corp., 197 N.E. 354 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1935) (holding defendant liable for equipment he ordered
in the name of "Givner's Dry Cleaning", a business actually
owned by his w_ife, because the name "Givner •s Dry Cleaning"
did not indicate that it was something other than a trade name
under which defendant himself did business); Crown Controls,
Inc. v. Smiley, 756 P.2d 717 (Wash. 1988) (holding president
of corporation liabl e for equipment he ordered for his
business "Industrial Associates•• because seller was unaware of
corporate status and corporate name of defendant's business
and trade name "Industrial Associates" signified partnership).
33.

23. Id. at 488.
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1990).

LAW OF

R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF' CORPORATIONS

58 (1983).

27. E.g., Id. at 73-75.
28. E.g., Id. at 348. However, under certain circumstances,
such as where the corporate form has been used to protect
f raud, a court may "pierce the corporate veil" and hold
individual shareholders personally liable. E.g., 1 WILLIAM M.
FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41
(perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990)
2 9 • E.g. , 3A WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 1117, 1120 (perm. ed. rev. VOl. 1986) i
Bernard A. Riemer, Personal Liability of Corporate Officer for
pUrchases Made Without Disclosure of His Representative
Capacity, 72 CoM. L.J. 5 (1967).

30. See, e.g., Givner v. United States Hoffman Machinery
Corp., 197 N.E. 354 (Ohio Ct. App. 1935); Amans v. Campbell,
73 N.W. 506 (Minn. 1897).
31. see, e.g., G. w. Andersen Construction Co. v. Mars Sales,
210 Cal. Rptr. 409 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Van D. costas, Inc.
v. Rosenberg, 432 so. 2d 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983);
McCluskey Commissary, Inc. v. Sullivan, 524 P.2d 1063 (Idaho
1974); Lankton-ziegle-Terry & Assoc. v. Griffin, 509 N.E.2d
785 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Alsco Iowa, Inc. v. Jackson, 118
N.W.2d 565 (Iowa 1962); Haas v. Harris, 347 N.W.2d 838 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1984); Como v. Rhines, 645 P.2d 948 (Mont.
David v. Shippy, 684 S.W.2d 586 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985);
Bio-Botanica, Inc. v. Leiner, 624 A.2d 1003 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1993); New England Marine Contractors v. Martin, 549
N.Y.S.2d 535 (App. Div. 1989); Lumer v. Marone, 569 N.Y.S.2d
321 (App. Term 1990); Howell v. Smith, 134 S.E.2d 381 (N.C.
1964); Lachmann v. Houston Chronicle Publishing co., 375
S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ . App. 1964); Crown Controls, Inc. v.
smiley, 756 P.2d 717 (Wash. 1988).

34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 321 comment a {1957)
("The inference of an understanding that the agent is a party
to the contract exists unless the agent gives such complete
information concerning his principal's identity that he can be
readily distinguished.") For cases holding an agent liable on
the basis that the principal was only partially disclosed,
see, e.g., Van D. Costas , Inc. v. Rosenberg, 432 So. 2d 656
(Fla. Dist • . ct. App. 1983) {finding principal partially
disclosed where officer/one-third owner of "Seascapes, Inc."
contracted for construction services using the corporation's
trade name "The Magic Moment Restaurant"); Alsco Iowa, Inc. v.
Jackson, 118 N.W.2d 565 (Iowa 1962) (finding principal, at
best, partially disclosed where majority shareholder of "Soo
Corporation" negotiated a contract for the purchase of goods
using the corporation's trade name, "American Insulation &
Supply"); David v. Shippy, 684 S.W.2d 586 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)
(finding principal partially disclosed where officer/one-half
owner of "Captain W.T. Walkers, Inc. 11 , an incorporated
restaurant business, contracted for advertising services using
the trade name of the restaurant- "Captain W.T. Walkers").
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35. E.g., Saco Dairy, 35 A.2d at 859. See, e.g., Myers-Leiber
sign Co. v. Weirich, 410 P.2d 491 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966)
(holding that plaintiff was properly denied recovery against
defendant who signed written contract in the name of
"Northern-Aire Lodge and country Club" because there was
sufficient evidence from which trial court could have found
that plaintiff knew "Northern-Aire Lodge and Country Club" was
the trade name of "Northern-Aire Development Company", a
corporation).
Even where the third party did not know the
precise corporate name of the principal, where the third party
knew or had reason to know that the principal was a
corporation, the agent has also not been held liable. See,
e.g., wired Music, Inc. v. Weimann, 468 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. ct.
App. 1971) (holding defendant/president of
Inc."
not liable for a written contract entered into
the name of
"Haystack Restaurant" where the contract, on its face, showed
defendant signed contract only as president of a corporate
entity, whatever its precise name).
Cf. Seattle Ass' n of
credit Men v. Green, 273 P.2d 513 (Wash. 1954) (rejecting
argument of creditors that they intended to do business with
a partnership where the trade name of the business contained
the word "Company" and thus placed creditors on inquiry notice
of the corporate status of business). However, several courts
have held that, even where the third party knows that the
agent is acting on behalf of a corporation, the agent is still
liable unless the third party knows the corporation's
corporate name.
see, e.g., Resnick v. Abner
Cohen
Advertising, 104 A.2d 254 (D.C. 1954)
that
written contract showed defendant was acting as an
of
a corporation when he signed the contract as
of
"American communication co.", but nonetheless
case
to determine whether plaintiff knew "Alllerican communication
co." was only the trade name of nRoyal Appliance Co., Inc.");
Western Seeds, Inc. v. Bartu, 704 P.2d 974 (Idaho Ct. App.
1985) (stating that trial court erroneously assumed that
partial disclosure of the principal disclosure of the
corporate status of defendant's business - was sufficient to
relieve from liability defendant who used the trade name
"Farmers Feed and Seed" rather than the corporate name
"Pocatello Cold Storage, Inc. 11 ) ; Detroit Pure Milk Co. v.
Patterson, 360 N.W.2d 221 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that
plaintiff's knowledge of the corporate status of defendant's
business was not sufficient to relieve defendant of liability
as the agent of a partially disclosed principal where
plaintiff did not know principal's corporate name); James G.
smith & Assoc. v. Everett, 439 N.E.2d 932 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981)
(holding defendant, who contracted for advertising services
for "The Clubhouse ", the registered trade name of "Dale F.
Everett Company, Inc.", liable as the agent of a partially
disclosed principal , or alternatively, as the agent of a
principal without legal capacity or status, even
all
billings were sent to "The Clubhouse, Inc." and
court
found that the evidence strongly indicated that plaintiff
intended to deal with a corporate client) .

36. See, e.g., Como v. Rhines, 645 P.2d 948 (Mont. 1982)
(holding trial court did not err in finding defendant owner of
"Sound West, Inc. 11 liable as a matter of law where there was
no showing that plaintiff understood that defendant was acting
for a corporation rather than as an individual doing business
as "Sound West"); New England Marine Contractors v. Martin,
549 N. Y.S. 2d 535 (App. Div. 1989) (holding that summary
judgment was properly granted where documentary evidence did
not indicate that the contracting party for clean-up services
was "Jim Martin Chevrolet, Inc." rather than Jim Martin doing
business as "Jim Martin Chevrolet").
37. From the appellate court's opinion in saco Dairy,
it
cannot be determined whether there was any evidence presented
at the trial level which showed that the plaintiff was led to
believe that the hotel was owned by the defendant. The point
being made is simply that the plaintiff could theoretically
have recovered against the defendant simply because the
defendant could show that the plaintiff had notice that the
hotel was owned by the defendant's mother rather than by the
defendant.
38. E.g.,
1990).
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39. While reliance is not an essential element in contract
analysis, see, e.g., Restatement {Second) of Contracts S 72
comment b (1979) (noting reliance is not necessary for a
promise to be supported by considerati on; a bargain is
sufficient), it is nonetheless an important concern. See,
e.g., Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contracts, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 269, 271 (1986). Moreover, reliance underlies
the presumptive liability of the agent of a partially
disclosed principal.
See note 15 and accompanying text.
Finally, reliance is a necessary element of an analogous
doctrine - partnership by estoppel. See William H. Painter,
Partnerspip by Estoppel, 16 vand. L. Rev. 327, 332-335 (1963)
(discussing the requirement of reliance as well as the
different judicial views on what constitutes sufficient
reliance). Under the partnership by estoppel doctrine, one who
expressly or impliedly represents himself to be, or consents
to being represented as, a partner in an actual or apparent
partnership, may be held liable to a third party who, on the
faith of this representation, has extended credit to the
actual or apparent partnership. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 16 ( 1)
(1914). In addition, the ostensible partner is deemed to be
an agent of those actual or apparent partners consenting to
this representation and thus has the power "to bind them to
the same extent and in the same manner as though he were a
partner in fact, with respect to persons who rely upon the
representation".
UNIFORM
PAR1.'NERSHIP ACT S 16 (2)
( 1914) .
Clearly, the theoretical concerns unde.r lying the partnership
by estoppel doctrine also underlie the rule imposing liability
on the agent of an undisclosed principal.
Moreover, some of
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the cases which have been analyzed under agency law could have
been resolved under the partnership by estoppel doctrine.
see, e.g., McCluskey commissary, Inc. v. Sullivan,
1063 (Idaho 1974) (noting trial court finding that
who supplied goods to defendants' incorporated
led to believe that the business was a partnersh1p or Jolnt
venture, but nonetheless affirming the trial court on the
basis of agency law).
under
law,
least under
the approach illustrated ln saco
and
a
third party can recover against an agent even where the thlrd
party did not rely on the individual liability of the agent.
40. 171 N.Y.S. 51 {App. Term 1918).

41. 191 N.Y.S. 720 (App. Term 1922).
42. 173 A.2d 116 (Pa. 1961) •
43. 171 N.Y.S. at 52.

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 191 N.Y.S. at 721.

THE SECRETS OF TEACHING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AN
EXISTING UNDERGRADUATE BUSINESS LAW COURSE
by
Robert Weill*
For most undergraduate law professors the inclusion of
international business law on their syllabi has yet to be
accomplished. Many professors confess t .h ey know little about
the subject and would not, in any event, know how to include
this material in their current courses.
This paper will
attempt to show that international business is a very significant and timely topic and that, consequently, international
business law is a very important and relevant subject. This
paper will provide a format for bringing international
business law into the undergraduate law curriculum so that
even the most uninitiated professors in this area can successfUlly bring this topic in from "left field" and include it in
their course coverage.

47. Id.
48. 173 A.2d at 118.

49. Id. at 119.

so.

Id. at 118-19.

51. Id. at 119.

52. Id.

Before World War II, the United States was a country
consistently trying to improve its national economy with
little regard economically towards the rest of the world. As
the last fifty years have passed, this country and other
nations have developed a complex web of international trading
patterns for goods and services that has created the global
marketplace that exists today. Whether it be singular export
or import transactions or the mass movements of goods, services, capital or technology across country borders, businesses around the world derive an ever-increasing percentage
of their revenues from international transactions.
Recognizing this state of affairs, universities, first
gradually and now with an unprecedented fervor, are internationalizing their curricula. 2 While management, marketing,
accounting and other traditional business courses have been
the main beneficiaries of this infusion of international
material, undergraduate law courses seem to have been modified
only minimally in this direction. Yet the need and rewards of
covering this material in greater depth is ever present.
*Professor of Law, Pace University

